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Abstract
Systems of selective distribution involve essentially two elements. First, the distribution does
not supply every dealer, retailer, or wholesaler who is willing to sell the products in question. Only
those who meet certain criteria are appointed as authorized retailers or wholesalers. Second, au-
thorized dealers may sell only to other authorized dealers, or, in the case of retailers, to users. It is
usual to classify the criteria for selecting the dealers to be approved as follows: 1) Qualitative and
Quantitative Criteria; 2) Objective and Subjective Criteria; 3) Technical Qualifications and Com-
mercial Qualifications. There may of course be obligations, including restrictive obligations, in a
selective distribution agreement that are not selection criteria or requirements. Many obligations
are not really criteria for selection of dealers, although they exclude dealers who are unable or
unwilling to accept them, and are not confined to selective distribution agreements. It will be seen
that the distinctions between qualitative and quantitative criteria, and between objective and sub-
jective criteria, although helpful, are not rigid distinctions. Some consequences of this important
fact are discussed below.
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INTRODUCTION
Systems of selective distribution' involve essentially two
elements. First, the distribution does not supply every dealer,
retailer, or wholesaler who is willing to sell the products in
question. Only those who meet certain criteria are appointed
as authorized retailers or wholesalers. Second, authorized
dealers may sell only to other authorized dealers, or, in the
case of retailers, to users.
It is usual to classify the criteria for selecting the dealers to
be approved as follows:
1) Qualitative and Quantitative Criteria: Qualitative crite-
ria relate to the technical or other requirements de-
manded or obligations imposed on the dealer which are
unrelated to the number of approved dealers in the state
or the region concerned. Quantitative criteria limit, and
are intended to limit, the number of dealers approved in
the particular state or region, even if there are other
dealers present who fulfill equally well all the qualitative
criteria. The basis for quantitative criteria may be the
size of the region to be covered by the dealer, its popula-
• Legal Advisor, Legal Service of the Commission of the European Communi-
ties, Brussels; Solicitor, Republic of Ireland; Visiting Lecturer, Trinity College, Dub-
lin. These Remarks are based on a presentation before the Studienvereinigung
Kartellrecht, Brussels, March 16, 1983.
1. See generally Burst & Kovar, Distribution Selective et le Droit Communitaire de la Con-
currence, 31 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 459 (1978); Canenbley, An-
titrust Problems with Regard to Distributing Under the Laws of the EEC, 5 INT'L Bus. LAw 177
(1977); Chard, The Economics of Exclusive Distributorship Arrangements with Special Reference
to EEC Competition Policy, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 405 (1980); Frignani, Selectives Vertrieb-
ssystem in der EWG: Eine Falsch Ausgelegte und Schlecht Geloste Frage, 28 WIRTSCHAF-r &
WETrBEWERB 365 (1978); Gijlstra & Murphy, Distribution Systems and EEC Competition
Law: The Law as it Stands, 1 LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 81 (1976); Hootz, Freistel-
lung Selektiver Vertriebssystem Nach EWG-kartellrecht, 24 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN
WIRTSHAIFr 108 (1978); Osterveil, Developing EEC Antitrust Law in the Field of Distribu-
tion Under Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, 8 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 77 (1976); Piriou,
Distribution Selective et les Regles Communitaires de Concurrence, 14 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE
DE DROIT EUROPEAN 602 (1978); Salzman, Analogies Between United States and Common
Market Antitrust Law in the Field of Distribution, 13 INT'L LAW. 47 (1979); Vajda, Selective
Distribution in the European Community, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 409 (1979); Note, EEC-
Article 85-Selective Distribution Agreements May Not Include Prohibition on Exports, 10 GA.J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 673 (1980).
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tion, or its wealth, or the number of potential customers
or potential sales estimated in some other way.
2) Objective and Subjective Criteria: Objective criteria are
explicit and reasonably precise criteria capable of being
applied by any person who is aware of their terms and of
the dealer to whom it is proposed to apply. Subjective
criteria are often not explicit, or if explicit are so vague
or so dependent on the attitudes of the person applying
them that it is difficult to decide whether they are met by
a given dealer or not.
3) Technical Qualifications and Commercial Qualifications:
Technical qualifications may be required if customers
want technical advice or after sales services which can be
provided only by technically qualified staff. Commercial
qualifications are usually expressed as obligations, for
example, to a minimum stock, or to have a minimum
turnover.
There may of course be obligations, including restrictive
obligations, in a selective distribution agreement that are not
selection criteria or requirements. Many obligations are not
really criteria for selection of dealers, although they exclude
dealers who are unable or unwilling to accept them, and are
not confined to selective distribution agreements.
It will be seen that the distinctions between qualitative and
quantitative criteria, and between objective and subjective cri-
teria, although helpful, are not rigid distinctions. Some conse-
quences of this important fact are discussed below.
In any selective distribution system involving quantitative
criteria, there are likely to be unexpressed subjective criteria in
practice.2 This occurs when the manufacturer or distributor
making the selection is compelled to choose between two or
more dealers who are all qualified according to the nonquan-
titative criteria, but only one, or few, of whom the manufac-
turer or distributor proposes or is free under the quantitative
criteria to appoint. The manufacturer may choose the dealer
who best meets the nonquantitative criteria. Or he may act on
other considerations such as location of premises, membership
in a trade association, established reputation, or willingness to
2. Sharpe, Refusal to Supply, 99 LAw Q. REV. 36 (1983)(correctly stressing that
long term relationships between manufacturers and dealers include much more than
the terms of the contracts involved).
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maintain prices. The basis on which the manufacturer or dis-
tributor chooses between apparently equally qualified dealers
may be extremely important, but is often not expressly stated
anywhere.
A series of exclusive distributorship and dealership agree-
ments, at wholesale and retail level, may appear similar to a
selective distribution system. However, they differ in three
ways. First, exclusive agreements do not normally include a
prohibition on resale to unauthorized dealers, otherwise they
would need an individual exemption. Second, exclusive agree-
ments restrict competition within the meaning of article 85(3)
of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity3 (EEC Treaty) only on strictly limited conditions set out in
Regulation 67/67' or under article 85(3) if they are associated
with territorial protection or with resale price maintenance.
I. ADVANTAGES OF SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION
The nature of the advantages obtained by the manufac-
turer or distributor from qualitative criteria depend on the
terms of the criteria applied or the obligations imposed.
Where the dealer is expected to have technical qualifications or
to maintain technically qualified staff, the manufacturer may
benefit from the assurance that the dealer will be able to pro-
vide advice and after sales service to his customers. Even
where no such advice or service is required or even possible,
the manufacturer, particularly of luxury or prestige products,
may for presentational reasons wish his products to be sold
only by sales representatives with a certain training and per-
haps appearance. Similarly the manufacturer may wish his
products to be sold only from trading premises at which cer-
3. Mar. 25, 1957, art. 85(3), 1973 Gr. Brit. TS. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II)(official
English translation), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (unofficial English translation) [hereinafter cited
as EEC Treaty].
4. 10J.O. COMM. EUR. 849 (1967), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2727. Regu-
lation 67/67 came into force on May 1, 1967. Its duration was initially limited to
December 31, 1972, but was later extended to June 30, 1983 by Regulation No.
2591/72, 15J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 276) 15 (1972), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
2728.01 and Regulation No. 3577/82, 25 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. L 373) 58 (1982), 1
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2728.01. It has recently been replaced by Regulation
No. 1983/83, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 1 (1983), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
2730. See Schr6ter, The Application of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty to Exclusive Distribu-
tion Agreements, 8 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (1984).
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tain technical equipment or facilities are available, or where
the surroundings have the atmosphere that he thinks best for
selling his product, without involving the manufacturer in ver-
tical integration.
Such requirements may be called technical or presenta-
tional criteria or qualifications. What are called "commercial
qualifications" are often expressed in quantitative terms, and
are really obligations imposed on the dealer, e.g., to maintain a
stock of a certain size or variety, to achieve a minimum turno-
ver, to engage in a certain amount of advertising or other pro-
motional activity, and to keep certain records. The advantages
of such commercial qualifications for the manufacturer are that
he is assured a certain minimum demand for the products in
question through a limited number of outlets, and that cus-
tomers may have a larger selection of his products available to
them on the dealer's premises than the dealer might otherwise
think it worthwhile to maintain. The manufacturer, therefore,
may get certain modest benefits in planning his production
and the marketing of his products at the point of sale, the
maintenance of the reputation of his brand and, in the case of
technical qualifications, an assurance of adequate services to
the users of his products.
In the case of a product of which supplies are limited, the
dealer may perhaps get an assurance of rather more secure
supplies than would be the case without a selective distribution
system. More important, he is likely to benefit, in practice,
from a rather higher profit margin than he would have other-
wise. Specialized dealers may benefit from being free from
competition from large scale nonspecialized outlets which, if
the distribution system were nonselective, could often sell the
goods more cheaply, perhaps without providing services. The
consumer or user may benefit from the availability of techni-
cally qualified advice and after-sales service where these are
necessary, and sometimes the convenience of having a nearby
outlet in an area where an outlet would be uneconomical if the
number of outlets in neighboring areas was unlimited.
Whether and to what extent any of these advantages are
realized in fact in any given selective distribution system will
depend entirely on the circumstances. How far factor alloca-
tion and economic efficiency is optimized by limiting outlets
and thereby tending to increase the return on the dealers' capi-
REMARKS
tal will also depend entirely on the circumstances. Of course
selective distribution agreements may also contain a wide vari-
ety of other clauses which may restrict intrabrand or inter-
brand competition but which are not caused by or directly re-
lated to the selective nature of the distribution system in which
they occur. Except in the case of presentational requirements
for luxury products, the essence of the argument for selective
distribution is that the dealers are asked to make an invest-
ment, in specialized knowledge or in staff, premises, or equip-
ment, to sell the goods, and selectivity is intended to give them
an assurance that their investment will be profitable.
However, selectivity is not a sufficient condition for profit-
ability because it does not in itself give the dealer immunity
from parallel imports or from interbrand competition. Nor is
it a necessary condition for profitability; low prices to dealers,
or resale price maintenance, if it were lawful, would provide
much the same assurance. Nor is selectivity in itself sufficient
to ensure that dealers make the investment desired: specific
obligations must be imposed. In practice, even quantitative
criteria are often not related, except in the most vague and
general way, to the cost of the investment that the dealer is
required to make.
The best course of action is for the manufacturer to spec-
ify in detail what he requires the dealers to provide, and to
oblige himself to apply these requirements in a nondiscrimina-
tory way, which it is in any case normally required to do. The
cost of providing whatever is necessary can be estimated, and
dealers who do not think it is profitable to provide it will not
enter the system. The dealers may then be entitled to an as-
surance that the calculations they have made will not be upset
by the appointment of additional dealers unless this is justified
by an expansion of the market. However, the calculations
must in any case be liable to be upset by parallel imports and
interbrand competition, and to be valid may often assume a
certain degree of stability both of buying and of resale prices.
The economic effects of selective distribution and of re-
sale price maintenance are often similar.5 Sometimes resale
price maintenance is defended on the grounds that it is a sub-
stitute for, or a necessary supplement to, specific obligations
5. Sharpe, supra note 2, at 43-45, 64.
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imposed on dealers. The argument is that unless dealers are
assured substantial profits they will not make, or will not ac-
cept the obligation to make, the investment which the manu-
facturer wishes them to make. This may be the real purpose of
many selective distribution systems. However, if manufactur-
ers disguise resale price maintenance measures as selective dis-
tribution, they will confuse the arguments for what they are
doing, and they will cause their agreements to become void,
and make themselves liable for fines, as soon as they try to use
their selective distribution agreements for, or to supplement
them with, resale price maintenance measures.
It follows that it may often be necessary to look at the real
aims and needs behind a selective distribution agreement, not
at the reasons put forward for it. This must be done in the
context of the Common Market as a whole, and the parties
must be able to explain how parallel imports from other mem-
ber states fit into what they are trying to do.
There are various kinds of products for which before-sales
or after-sales services may be thought advantageous. If these
services are provided by dealers, there may be nonprice com-
petition in respect of those services. It is, however, hard to see
any justification for the suggestion that intrabrand nonprice
competition in respect of these services is, or could be, more
important than intrabrand price competition. The services
may be necessary in order to enable the dealers to compete.
But they are not the main way, and they should not become the
only way, in which they do compete. In any case, if the number
of dealers is limited, it is unlikely that intrabrand competition
between them in services will be very vigorous.
II. DISADVANTAGES OF SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION
By definition a selective distribution system involves fewer
outlets than would exist if the system was nonselective.
Whether the number of approved dealers is only marginally
less than, or is a tiny proportion of, the number of dealers who
otherwise would exist depends on all the circumstances. A
substantially reduced number of outlets in a given region may
undesirably restrict the choice conveniently available to con-
sumers, and reduce intrabrand price and other competition.
REMARKS
Quantitative criteria necessarily impede market entry by new
dealers and by new types of retail outlets such as supermarkets.
Selective distribution systems greatly facilitate pressure
both on manufacturers and approved dealers to act, or not to
act, in certain ways. In particular, these systems put pressure
on dealers and manufacturers not to reduce their resale prices,
not to buy parallel imports, not to sell outside their territories,
or not to sell competing brands. Pressure can be imposed by
reducing supplies, restricting credit, or threatening to refuse
supplies or actually doing so, or in other ways. At Community
level a series of national selective distribution systems may
maintain prices at significantly different levels in different
member states, because they greatly inhibit sales between deal-
ers in different member states.
The disadvantages of selective distribution systems are of
two kinds: those that result inevitably from the reduced
number of outlets, and those which result from the incentives
and opportunities given by a selective system. It may be ar-
gued that selective distribution normally restricts only in-
trabrand competition, and that vertical restrictions on in-
trabrand competition are less serious than horizontal restric-
tions and restrictions on interbrand competition.
Nevertheless, there are a number of other issues to con-
sider. First, selective distribution inhibits price competition,
which is, or ought to be, the most important kind of competi-
tion in most consumer markets. Second, a series of vertical
restrictions may have the same economic effects as a horizontal
restriction between dealers. Third, insofar as selective distri-
bution inhibits price competition, it necessarily reduces inter-
brand competition. Fourth, if all or most of the manufacturers
in a given sector operate selective distribution systems, they
will tend substantially to reduce interbrand competition and
they will facilitate horizontal restrictions on price competition
between dealers, or between manufacturers, or both. Fifth, se-
lective distribution systems have the effect of confining dealers
to their own member states and preventing sales of trade quan-
tities across intra-Community frontiers which alone could re-
duce differences in price levels between member states. These
price differences are often much greater than the differences in
price within any one member state, and therefore it is particu-
larly important in the interests of Community users and con-
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sumers, that competition should be free to reduce or eliminate
them.
Clearly, while selective distribution systems may have
worthwhile effects, few generalizations can be made about
them: their effects depend on the circumstances, and cannot be
deduced merely from the terms of the agreements themselves.
Selective distribution systems limit market entry by manu-
facturers of competing products, if each distributor is free to
sell only one manufacturer's products. If all existing suitable
dealers are bound by exclusive arrangements, a new manufac-
turer may be unable to enter the market without setting up his
own dealers. Sometimes, even if the existing dealerships are
not formally exclusive the dealers are reluctant to sell compet-
ing products, especially imported products, and it may be un-
economic for a dealer to sell only the imported products and
not domestic ones; for example, newspapers, as in Salonia v.
Poidomani.6
The extent of the effects on intrabrand and interbrand
competition resulting from a selective distribution system var-
ies greatly. Partitioning of the Common Market almost always
has a substantial effect on competition. Resale price mainte-
nance usually does so. On the other hand, whether quantita-
tive criteria significantly affect consumer choice, intrabrand
competition or market entry by dealers depends on the circum-
stances. It is possible to imagine circumstances in which a rela-
tively small number of large dealers could provide more effec-
tive intrabrand competition than a large number of small out-
lets, although it is doubtful whether this often occurs in
practice.
III. DEALERS' KNOWLEDGE OF THE SELECTION
CRITERIA
A distribution system may be selective even if it is not so
described in the distribution agreements between the manu-
facturer or distributor, and the dealers, even if there are no
written agreements setting out the selection criteria. Whether
a given distribution system is selective depends first on how
the manufacturer or distributor acts in practice in deciding
6. 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1563, 1579, 1588, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8758, at 9100, 9105-06.
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how many and which dealers to appoint, and secondly on
whether it is part of the understanding between the dealers
and the manufacturer that the number of dealers will be lim-
ited. It is not necessary, for article 85(1) to apply, that the
dealers know all the details of the selection criteria used by the
manufacturer, or that the criteria themselves be the subject of
any agreement with the dealers, or even that there be an un-
derstanding that the criteria may not be changed without no-
tice to the dealers.
In selective distribution systems it is common for a certain
discretion to be reserved to the manufacturer, either expressly
or de facto, even if it is only for the purpose of allowing him to
choose freely which of several similarly qualified dealers he will
appoint. The fact that the manufacturer is practicing a selec-
tive system, must be known to the dealers, even if the details of
the selection criteria were not made clear to them, since they
would be prohibited from selling to nonapproved dealers.
Once it is shown that it is part of the basis on which the dealers
entered into or maintained their agreements with the manufac-
turer that there would be some restrictions on the number of
dealers appointed in the future, that is sufficient to show that
the restrictions, whatever they may be exactly from time to
time, are part of the overall arrangements.
The dealers do not need to know that the criteria are
quantitative for article 85(1) to apply. At first sight it would
seem unfair that article 85(1) might apply to their agreement
without their knowing it, or as a result of the action of the
other party to the agreement. However, this does not with-
stand consideration. First, if the dealers know that selection
criteria are being used, the criteria must, in principle, be either
quantitative or qualitative. Even if they are qualitative, as is
shown below, they may have quantitative effects, and so may
come under article 85(1). Therefore even if the dealers know
that the criteria were formally qualitative, they could not be
certain that the criteria were immune from article 85(1).
Second, it is surely a principle of law that a person enter-
ing into an agreement cannot put himself in a better position
by not ascertaining its terms, or the terms of anything referred
to in it, than he would be if he found them out correctly and in
detail. Third, in almost all selective distribution systems the
manufacturer retains some discretion. The way that discretion
1985]
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is exercised may affect the legal position of the system under
article 85(1). But if the dealers have accepted, even impre-
cisely, an arrangement under which the manufacturer has re-
tained a discretion which may alter the legal position of the
agreement, they cannot claim to be unaffected by the exercise
of a discretion which allowed the manufacturer to use quantita-
tive criteria when he chose to do so. Of course it might be
wrong to fine the dealers for unlawfulness due to the acts of
the manufacturer rather than their own acts, and of course in
practice much may depend on questions of evidence. But in
principle it seems clear that article 85(1) may apply even if the
dealers cannot be proven to have known that the criteria being
applied by the manufacturer included quantitative criteria.
Fourth, in any selective distribution system the approved
dealers are prohibited from selling to nonapproved dealers.
This is in itself always a restriction on competition, except in
the unusual case in which there is some noneconomic necessity
which makes sales by nonapproved dealers seriously undesir-
able, as in the case of pharmaceutical products which may be
sold only on a doctor's prescription. Approved dealers must
be aware of any such prohibition, and therefore are aware that
the agreement may fall under article 85(1) unless the selection
criteria, whatever they may be exactly, can be justified.
A somewhat similar issue arises in connection with unilat-
eral action by a manufacturer which may make a restrictive
agreement ineligible for exemption under article 85(3). It is
clear that unilateral interference with parallel imports may
have that effect, as article 3 of Regulation 67/67 shows. How-
ever, the innocent party to an agreement that becomes invalid
due to the action of the other party may have a right to be
indemnified by the other party against any loss he suffers as a
result.
IV. QUALITATIVE CRITERIA
Qualitative criteria do not necessarily restrict competition.
However, even objective criteria of a qualitative nature may re-
strict competition if they exceed the requirements of an appro-
priate distribution of the products, i.e., if they are unnecessa-
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rily strict. 7 For example, if dealers were obliged by a manufac-
turer to have highly trained staff even if the dealers rarely
supplied technical services or advice to users, or if the product
did not require them, the requirement would restrict competi-
tion. Where requirements are imposed for presentational or
prestige reasons it is less easy to judge whether the require-
ments are reasonable or not (indeed they may hardly be "ob-
jective") but clearly they restrict competition if they go further
than is genuinely necessary, as in practice they usually do if
they have any significant effect. The question thus is not
whether the agreement obliges the dealers to provide services,
but whether it is technically necessary, given the nature of the
product, that they should provide them.
Criteria which appear to be qualitative may, and often do,
have quantitative effects, even if they are not expressed or even
intended to do so. For example, commercial requirements
such as the obligation to maintain a minimum stock or to stock
7. Metro SB-Grossmarkte GmbH v. Comm'n, 1977 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1875,
1904-05, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8435, at 7868;
see L'Oreal N.V. v. De Nieuwe A.M.C.K., 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3775, 3791,
[1979-1981Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8715, at 8607 (holding
that it may be necessary to consider whether the characteristics of the product re-
quire a selective distribution system to preserve its quality and ensure its proper use,
but that the criteria may not go beyond what is necessary); see also Hasselblad v.
Comm'n. 1984 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 883, 3 COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 14,014, at
14,187-88; AEG-Telefunken v. Comm'n, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 3151, 3194-95, 3
COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 14,018, at 14,258; Salonia v. Poidomani, 1981 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1563, 1580-81, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP.
(CCH) 8758, at 9101. In Van Landewych v. Comm'n, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep.
3125, 3265, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8687, the
European Court of Justice (Court), in reply to an argument based on the Metro
Grossmarkte judgment, stressed that the latter concerned a system "conceived . . .
for the purpose of distributing highly technical, durable consumer goods so that
traders had to be selected on the basis of qualitative criteria." Id.; see BMW, 18 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 29) 1, 4-5 (1975), [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET)r.
REP. (CCH) 9701, at 9539-7 to 9539-8; see also Junghans, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 30) 10 (1977), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9912;
SABA, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 28) 19 (1976), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] Com-
MON MET. REP. (CCH) 9802; Omega, 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 242) 22 (1970),
[1970-1972 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 9396; Kodak, J.O. COMM.
EUR. (No. L. 147) 24 (1970), [1970-1972 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 9378. One author states that "to be meaningful, qualitative criteria must
have a quantitative effect." Chard, The Economics of the Application of Article 85 to Selec-
tive Distribution Systems, 1982 EUR. L. REV. 83, at 97. The Commission has never de-
nied this. He also points out, correctly, that minimum turnover requirements have
quantitative effects. Id. at 98.
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the entire range of the manufacturer's products, may impose
costs on the distributor which make it uneconomic for more
than one dealer in a given region to accept them. Similarly, a
minimum turnover obligation may be set at a level such that
not all the dealers who fulfill the qualitative requirements of
the distribution arrangements would be able to achieve it, and
if so it has quantitative effects. 8 Even apparently technical re-
quirements such as the obligation to have technically trained
staff, or, in the case of cars, to maintain a twenty-four hour
repair service, may have quantitative effects, since only large
dealers with a substantial volume of business may find it eco-
nomic to accept them. If apparently qualitative criteria or obli-
gations have quantitative effects in practice, the dealers' obli-
gations to fulfill these criteria restrict competition within the
meaning of article 85(1).
Similarly, presentational requirements such as the obliga-
tion to sell only in premises of a certain minimum size or only
if a certain minimum floor area is devoted to displaying the
products concerned, have quantitative effects if not all the
dealers who fulfill the qualitative requirements can economi-
cally provide premises or display areas of the size in question.
Presentational requirements such as the criterion that luxury
products should be sold only through retail outlets of the high-
est standing may have quantitative effects even if they are im-
precise and incapable of being objectively applied.
Whether apparently qualitative criteria have significant
quantitative effects cannot be judged from the terms of the cri-
teria themselves, even assuming they have been made explicit,
but can only be assessed in the light of the surrounding cir-
cumstances. One cannot decide whether a requirement to
achieve a given minimum turnover has quantitative effects un-
til one knows, by reference to the current aggregate volume of
sales in the region, how many of the dealers who fulfill reason-
able requirements could be expected to achieve the minimum.
Whether a given requirement has quantitative effects, and the
extent of those effects, may vary over time for a given manufac-
turer, and may be different for different manufacturers of com-
peting products in a given region and at a given time.
8. L'Oreal v. De Nieuwe A.M.C.K., 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3775, 3791
[1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8715, at 8607.
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The quantitative effects of an obligation to maintain a
minimum stock or to stock the manufacturer's entire range
may be altered if the manufacturer increases the minimum
stock requirement or significantly expands his range of goods,
or even if he puts up the prices he charges to dealers for the
same goods. Quantitative effects may even be altered by
changes in the credit terms on which the dealers are supplied
by the manufacturer, since if these are generous they will re-
duce the cost to the dealer of carrying the required stocks. If
the terms on which credit is available to the dealers, whether
from the manufacturer or from financial institutions, alter as a
result of changes in interest rates, the quantitative effects of a
given stock requirement may also alter.
Even when the product is technologically complex, it can-
not be assumed that only technically qualified dealers should
sell it, since the dealers do not necessarily give or need to give
either technical advice or repair and maintenance services.
Dealers do not necessarily check that each item is in all re-
spects in working order when they sell it, even if the manufac-
turer's checking procedure cannot be relied on because the
goods might have been damaged in transit. But there may of
course be economies of scale in stocks of spare parts and in
carrying out repair and maintenance services, which may make
it appropriate for only dealers to carry out those services. The
European Court ofJustice (Court) in Metro-Grossmarkte GmbH v.
Commission said that selective distribution was compatible with
article 85(1)
provided that resellers are chosen on the basis of objective
criteria of a qualitative nature relating to the technical quali-
fications of the reseller and his staff and the suitability of his
trading premises and that such conditions are laid down
uniformly for all potential resellers and are not applied in a
discriminatory fashion.'
The Court does not seem to have meant that qualitative crite-
ria could only relate to technical qualifications and suitability
of premises, although the Court may have had in mind that
9. Salonia v. Poidomani, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1563, 1580, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8758, at 9101; Metro SB-Grossmarkte
GmbH v. Comm'n, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, 1904, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8435, at 7868.
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most other qualitative criteria are likely to have quantitative ef-
fects. But the Court should not be regarded as having implied
that a requirement that a dealer should maintain sophisticated
testing machinery, for example, could never be regarded as
qualitative.
The rule that even qualitative criteria are nonrestrictive,
provided they are necessary, only if they are both laid down
and applied uniformly is extremely important. Qualitative cri-
teria may not be supplemented by additional unexpressed cri-
teria or preferences. The manufacturer may not in practice ap-
ply the qualitative criteria in such a way as to disqualify dealers
who have been exporting, importing, selling competing prod-
ucts or reducing prices, or doing anything else of which the
manufacturer may disapprove.
It also means that if a manufacturer does not lay down the
same qualitative criteria in all member states, or does not apply
them uniformly, the manufacturer must prove that the differ-
ences are justified by objective differences between the situa-
tions in the different member states. Member states may not
be treated as separate or watertight compartments for the pur-
pose of considering whether the application in practice of
qualitative criteria is uniform and nondiscriminatory. Selective
distribution arrangements must always be looked at in the con-
text of the Common Market as a whole.
In one of the Perfume cases the court stated that "[i]n prin-
ciple a selective distribution network admission to which is
made subject to conditions going beyond simple, objective
qualitative criteria falls within the prohibition laid down in Ar-
ticle 85(1), especially when it is based on quantitative selection
criteria."' 0
V. QUANTITATIVE CRITERIA
Quantitative criteria are those which limit, and are usually
intended to limit, the number of dealers appointed, even if
there are, or might be in the future, other dealers in the region
10. Lanc6me v. Etos, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2511, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8714; L'Oreal v. De Nieuwe A.M.C.K., 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3775, 3791, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP.
(CCH) 8715, at 8607; see SSI, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 232) 1, 22-24 (1982), 3
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,408, at 10,893-95.
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in question who comply equally well with whatever nonquan-
titative criteria are being applied. The fact that at a given mo-
ment there may be no otherwise qualified dealers in the region
in question who are excluded from the system only because of
the quantitative criterion does not alter the fact that it is quan-
titative, meaning its object and effect is to limit the number of
dealers who can be appointed in accordance with the terms of
the distribution arrangements.
Quantitative criteria are usually intended to ensure that
the aggregate profits of each authorized dealer are maintained
at a level regarded as sufficient to enable him to provide cer-
tain services, or simply to maintain his interest in selling the
goods in question. This does not in itself cause unit prices to
rise; in theory, it could make it unnecessary for dealers to raise
them. But it reduces intrabrand competition, both by reducing
the competition between authorized dealers and by restricting
market entry, even by dealers who would be willing to buy
from authorized dealers if they were free to do so. If there is
little intrabrand competition, pressure to improve dealers' per-
formance can come only from the manufacturer, or from inter-
brand competition. Even if the quantitative criteria are
adopted to ensure that dealers can pay for services to custom-
ers, the result may be that there is not competition, in each
region, in the provision of those services. New market entry
can occur only if an existing dealer leaves the system or is
taken over by the proposed entrant, in which case there is no
net increase in the number of outlets, or if the market, as mea-
sured by the criteria, expands.
A requirement, the purpose of which is to try to ensure
that the dealer obtains a certain minimum level of aggregate
profits, cannot be justified on technical grounds. It certainly
cannot be justified if the dealer is not providing significant
technical services to customers, or if the cost of providing the
services is not the basis for the formula used to determine how
many dealers should be appointed. There is very little evi-
dence that such formulae are in fact related to the cost of pro-
viding whatever services are provided; if they were, they would
have to be revised from time to time. It is not always clear that
the higher wages of staff with the technical qualifications ex-
pected, or the cost of paying the staff while they attend re-
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fresher courses, are related in any real way to the aggregate
profit levels aimed at.
A quantitative criterion, the aim of which is to maintain
the aggregate profits of dealers, cannot be justified simply on
the grounds that it is needed to ensure that dealers have staff
qualified to supply these services, since that aim could be
achieved directly by qualitative criteria, and the dealers them-
selves could be left to determine whether, in their particular
circumstances, it was economic for them to provide the serv-
ices in question on the basis required. At most the manufac-
turer could justify supplying a proposed new dealer with esti-
mates of his probable sales and the profits out of which he
would have to pay for the services he would be undertaking to
provide, and the probable cost of these services.
Even if a quantitative restriction on the number of dealers
can be justified, it does not necessarily follow that it can be
justified in combination with a prohibition on resale to nonap-
proved dealers. If it is important that certain services are avail-
able to customers in each region, it does not necessarily follow
that every dealer selling the product must provide them. This
is answered by arguments about economies of scale, which do
not necessarily justify restriction on competition, and by the
"free rider" argument that the clever customers would get ad-
vice on what model to buy from the authorized dealer, who
bears the cost of providing the technically qualified staff, but
buy the product more cheaply from another dealer outside the
network. However, if the manufacturer sells only to approved
dealers then those dealers will sell, if they are not prohibited
from doing so, either to consumers or to nonapproved dealers,
and sell in each case at a price at which they can obtain a profit
which pays for the cost of maintaining qualified staff.
But, it is said, if nonapproved dealers are selling the
goods, it will be difficult if not impossible to ensure that they
are not buying from approved dealers in other member states
where prices are lower. So the argument against allowing ap-
proved dealers to sell to unapproved dealers resolves itself
into an argument against parallel imports, in precisely the cir-
cumstances in which it is important that consumers should be
free to benefit from them. Even more important, the argument
assumes that approved dealers will not themselves cause the
same problem by importing from other lower price states.
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If this assumption is right, it can only be due to the exist-
ence of some understanding prohibiting approved dealers
from buying from one another, or from importing parallel im-
ports, or from selling below the national price levels, or to a
practice by which the manufacturer ensures that dealers in low
price member states do not receive products suitable for ex-
port or quantities adequate for export. Any such understand-
ing would be prima facie unlawful and any such understanding
or practice would be likely to make unlawful the selective dis-
tribution agreements with which it was associated.
Chard says restrictions on cross supplies even between ap-
proved dealers may be indispensable if appropriate levels of
distributor services vary between member states." This is un-
likely to be the case with technical services, and he assumes
differences in advertising levels. But genuinely necessary addi-
tional advertising costs are usually borne by the manufacturer,
and if they are paid by it as well, the "free rider" argument
vanishes. Manufacturers cannot justify export bans merely by
adding to advertising costs.
Rather little critical consideration seems to have been
given to the arguments for quantitative commercial criteria.
For example, minimum turnover clauses are more restrictive
than discounts for buying larger quantities, or for sales above a
certain figure, and it is not clear that they are always more ef-
fective to help the manufacturer to plan his production.
The argument that restrictions on intrabrand competition
are needed to ensure that dealers cover their costs and make a
reasonable profit sounds persuasive, but ignores the fact that it
is precisely to keep down costs that competition is important.
11. Chard, supra note 7, at 92. Chard states that restrictions on sales between
approved dealers may be necessary to get dealers to invest in after sales services, but
gives no explanation. Id. at 92-93. I find it difficult to see a legitimate one. He seems
to believe that territorial protection greater than inherent in a selective distribution
system may sometimes be needed, but gives no indication of what he has in mind and
does not explain how a ban on sales between approved dealers would give territorial
protection. Some of his paper is taken up with complaints that the Commission did
not, in its decision, consider possibilities not raised by the parties and not suggested
by a detailed knowledge of the facts. His argument is weakened further by his failure
to distinguish between sales to other approved dealers and sales to unapproved deal-
ers, and his failure to explain whether he is considering the situation in one member
state or in several. In the circumstances both his conclusion and his criticism of the
Commission seem misplaced.
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In sectors where all or most manufacturers have distribution
arrangements which restrict intrabrand competition, whether
selective or not, it is very likely that all dealers are sheltered
from competitive pressures to reduce their costs. Competition
is necessary at all levels of industry, not only at the level of
manufacturers. Since a manufacturer cannot shelter his deal-
ers from interbrand competition or from parallel imports by
selective distribution arrangements, and normally cannot law-
fully do so in any other way, there may be very little justifica-
tion for selective agreements that restrict intrabrand competi-
tion but cannot ensure that dealers obtain the net profits that
are intended.
In some cases there may be technical reasons for prohibit-
ing sales by nonapproved dealers because, it is said, public
safety may demand that a car is thoroughly checked by trained
staff provided by the dealer before it is sold. This argument,
applied to new cars, suggests some lack of confidence in the
checking done by the manufacturer. It does not explain a pro-
hibition on sales by approved dealers to nonapproved dealers,
since the approved dealers can still check the cars before they
sell them, and it entirely ignores the whole field of second
hand cars, which are much more likely to be dangerous to the
public than new cars.
Sometimes quantitative criteria are based on the relatively
short shelf life of the product in question. To avoid wastage
and the return of unsaleable goods to the manufacturer, a min-
imum turnover is required which will be related to the shelf
life. Such an argument must be based on factual information
about shelf life and frequency and cost of deliveries to dealers,
but, if sound, it justifies a minimum turnover requirement and
quantitative selection criteria only insofar as they may be
needed to ensure the minimum turnover.
In all cases it is for the parties to the selective distribution
agreements to show that the criteria for selection of dealers
and the ban on sales to nonapproved dealers, both of which
are prima facie restrictive, are in fact not so because of the
characteristics of the product or the distribution system which
they make necessary.
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VI. OTHER OBLIGATIONS IN SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEMS: RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
Although, for reasons indicated elsewhere in this paper,
resale price maintenance arrangements are often associated
with selective distribution systems, obligations imposed on
dealers in relation to resale prices cannot be justified by refer-
ence to the selective nature of the distribution system. They
always restrict competition within the meaning of article 85(1)
and if they affect trade between member states appreciably,
they must be justified, if they can be justified, only on other
grounds. Resale price maintenance might be prompted by the
wish to provide dealers with minimum aggregate gross profits,
which can explain minimum turnover requirements. But this
does not justify it, because it eliminates intrabrand price com-
petition entirely, and because it adds a further and seriously
restrictive element to a distribution system which may already
be restrictive because of its selective nature. Resale price
maintenance is not normally a permissible method of trying to
ensure a certain level of minimum profits for dealers.' 2
It is often said that pharmacists are a special case of selec-
tive distribution where resale price maintenance is justified,
because of the cost to them of having to keep readily available
stocks of medicines which may be rarely needed but which,
when needed, may be required urgently. Whatever validity
this argument may have for the whole business of any individ-
ual pharmacist, it does not necessarily justify maintenance of
the resale price of any particular manufacturer's products,
since nobody sells exclusively the products of one pharmaceu-
tical firm. The argument has to be considered in the context of
the pharmacists' entire business for all products, not in the
light of one manufacturer's distribution system.
Agreements and concerted practices about resale prices
may restrict competition within the meaning of article 85(1),
even if the price level to be respected is not precisely defined.
A selective distribution system in practice often puts the manu-
facturer in a position to exert pressure on dealers not to re-
duce their prices very much, even if there may be no formal
12. AEG-Telefunken, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 117) 15 (1982), 3 COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,366, rev'd, AEG-Telefunken v. Comm'n, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. 3151, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 14,018.
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agreement on fixed or recommended prices. Such pressure is
specially likely to arise in practice if the dealer in question is
selling parallel imports as well as goods bought from the man-
ufacturer's own outlet in the member state concerned. It is
also likely to arise in practice in a member state where resale
price maintenance as such is contrary to national law, but
where the manufacturer may nevertheless wish to ensure that
intrabrand price competition does not go too far. In such cir-
cumstances the manufacturer may tolerate a certain amount of
price competition, but intervene if the dealer reduces prices to
an extent which the manufacturer, or the other dealers in the
particular member state, think excessive. This is just as unlaw-
ful, assuming the requirements of article 85 are complied with,
as formal resale price maintenance, although of course it may
well be harder to prove.
In member states in which formal resale price mainte-
nance through manufacturers' price lists or otherwise is pro-
hibited, manufacturers who wish to prevent resale prices from
dropping more than a limited extent are likely to combine se-
lective distribution systems with a variety of efforts to prevent
parallel imports from reaching significant levels, and with
measures to discourage the dealers primarily concerned from
reducing their prices, if necessary supplementing the discour-
agement with threats of refusal to supply, or even with actual
cessation of supplies.
One device used by some manufacturers is to make the
granting of the manufacturer's guarantee to the ultimate con-
sumer conditional on the goods having been bought at the rec-
ommended retail price.' 3 Such a clause penalizes both the
dealer who sells below the recommended price and the con-
sumer who buys from him, and seems entirely unjustifiable.
A discussion of the circumstances in which resale price
maintenance may be lawful under Community competition law
would be outside the scope of these Remarks. It may be
enough to state that the fact that a selective distribution system
is lawful cannot in itself justify resale price maintenance meas-
ures associated with it. Moreover, a selective distribution sys-
tem which is combined with resale. price maintenance is more
restrictive than one which is not. Therefore, a notification of a
13. Sharpe, supra note 2, at 42-43.
REMARKS
selective distribution system which fails to mention that the
system is combined with resale price maintenance measures
will not protect the company from fines.
Furthermore, the resale price maintenance measures may
not only be unlawful in themselves, if they are the subject of an
agreement or concerted practice, but may make the selective
distribution system unlawful also, and may do this even if they
are unilaterally practiced by the manufacturer. Finally, resale
price maintenance in one member state cannot be effective for
long if parallel imports from lower price states can occur
freely. Thus, if a manufacturer tries to justify resale price
maintenance, he almost certainly has to try to justify a ban on
parallel imports as well, which he is unlikely to be able to do.
If resale price maintenance cannot work without interference
with parallel imports, it probably cannot be justified. If I am
right in thinking that many selective distribution systems are
associated with de facto resale price maintenance arrange-
ments, then these points are important.
VII. RESTRICTIONS ON SALES OUTSIDE THE DEALER'S
TERRITORY
Selective distribution agreements often contain clauses
prohibiting the dealers from selling outside their territories, or
even to customers from outside their territories. Such clauses
always restrict competition within the meaning of article 85(1),
and are extremely difficult to justify. 4 Clauses, however ex-
pressed, obliging the dealers to concentrate their activities
within their territory have to be looked at carefully. Like many
clauses in selective distribution agreements, and indeed in all
agreements, their effect on competition depends not only on
their words but on the interpretation given to them, and the
14. The Court said that articles 3 and 85 of the EEC Treaty, supra note 3, imply
the existence of workable competition, i.e., the degree of competition necessary to
achieve the basic requirements and the objectives of the Treaty "in particular the
creation of a single market achieving conditions similar to those of a domestic mar-
ket." Metro SB-Grossmarkte GmbH v. Comm'n, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875,
1904, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8435, at 7868; see
also Ciment et Betons v. Kerpen & Kerpen, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. -, 3 CoM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 14,043; Nungesser v. Comm'n, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
2015, 2068-70, 2073-74, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8805, at 7544-46; Salonia v. Poidomani, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1563, 1578,
[1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8758, at 9100.
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use made of them, in practice by the parties. Whether an area
of primary responsibility clause is a euphemism for a ban on
sales outside the territory may depend not only on the attitude
of the manufacturer but also on the attitude of other approved
dealers.
As in the case of resale price maintenance arrangements in
selective distribution systems, restrictions on the freedom of
the dealer to sell outside his territory often result from, or are
modified in their practical effect by, pressure from the manu-
facturer, or from other dealers, on a dealer who is thought to
be too active outside his allotted area. In particular, pressure
is likely to be applied if the dealer is selling outside the mem-
ber state where he carries on business, and if the price at which
it is profitable for him to sell to a parallel importer is signifi-
cantly lower than the price in the importing state.
Much the same result may be achieved by a manufacturer's
policy of selling to each dealer only the quantities which it is
thought that he can sell in his territory. If such a policy can be
proved, its effect may be similar to those of other "unilateral"
policies on the part of the manufacturer, or the dealer agree-
ment itself may oblige the manufacturer to supply only the
quantities which he believes the dealer will be able to sell in his
territory. Even if the manufacturer cannot always judge pre-
cisely what volume the dealer will be able to sell in his terri-
tory, the manufacturer will usually be able to ensure, if he
wishes to do so, that the dealer does not get stocks sufficient to
allow him to export in trade quantities regularly enough to af-
fect the price level in another member state.
Restrictions on sales outside the dealer's territory are
most important where there are differences in price levels be-
tween member states. In such circumstances two-tier price
structures are sometimes adopted obliging the dealer to pay a
higher price if he exports.' 5 Manufacturers sometimes try to
justify this by the "free rider" argument, i.e., that dealers in
15. See Distillers Co. Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2229, [1979-
1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8613; Distillers Co., 21 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 50) 16 (1978), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 10,011; Pittsburgh Corning Europe-Formica Belgium-Hertel, 15 J.O.
COMM. EUR. (No. L 272) 35 (1972), [1970-1972 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) $ 9539; Kodak, 13J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 147) 24 (1970), [1970-1972 Trans-
fer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9378.
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the importing, higher price, country incur large advertising
costs and it is unfair that dealers elsewhere who incur lower
costs take advantage of them. These arguments raise issues
outside the field of selective distribution which cannot be con-
sidered here. But often the problem could be avoided entirely
if the advertising costs, which in a two-tier price structure are
anyway borne by the manufacturer in the form of lower prices
to dealers, were paid by it directly. A manufacturer cannot jus-
tify a two-tier price system amounting to an export ban merely
by arranging for advertising expenses in higher price states to
be paid by local distributors or dealers when they are being
largely borne by the manufacturer.
It may be said that it would be less satisfactory for the
manufacturer to pay the advertising costs itself than to have its
distributor pay them. The cost presumably being the same
whoever pays it or bears it, the real problem is that in some
markets promotional expenses are higher than in others. If
parallel imports are allowed, whoever pays the higher ex-
penses will get the benefit of its expenditure only if it is the
source of the parallel imports also, that is, if it is the manufac-
turer. Inevitably markets requiring higher promotional expen-
diture will have to be subsidized by sales elsewhere, and this
will lessen the incentive to penetrate them. Clearly, this is not
enough to justify an export ban. Different levels of advertising
in different parts of one member state are not normally
thought to justify territorial protection within that state. These
are in any event theoretical comments. In practice, differences
in price levels do not seem to be merely equivalent to, and are
not primarily due to, differences in advertising costs, and so
cannot be justified by reference to them.
While for analytical purposes it is necessary to distinguish
between resale price maintenance and interference with ex-
ports, in practice they are often merely two ways by which the
manufacturer seeks to maintain price levels in higher price
member states. They are sometimes both used, if circum-
stances make that necessary, or manufacturers may use which-
ever most effectively prevents the competitive influences on
prices which the manufacturer dislikes.
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VIII. RESTRICTIONS ON SALES BETWEEN DEALERS AND
CUSTOMER RESTRICTIONS
It is inherent in a selective distribution system that ap-
proved dealers are prohibited from selling to nonapproved
dealers. That does not mean that such a prohibition is always
justified; it merely means that if there is no such prohibition,
the distribution system is not the kind normally called "selec-
tive." None of the arguments advanced to justify selective dis-
tribution systems explain restrictions on sales by one approved
dealer to another, whether directly or in the form of an obliga-
tion to sell only to consumers, and it is difficult to see on what
grounds such a restriction could ever be justified.
The most usual kind of restriction on sales between ap-
proved dealers is an export ban. Manufacturers frequently
wish to keep their national selective distribution systems in
separate compartments, and consider that it would upset their
price and other policies in the higher price states if parallel
imports were permitted. Sometimes a prohibition on sales be-
tween approved dealers is merely a disguised form of ban on
exports to other member states. But whatever intention may
lie behind a clause prohibiting sales between approved dealers,
such a clause always restricts competition within the meaning
of article 85(1).
A prohibition on sales between approved dealers is some-
times imposed to protect presales services, usually advertising,
at intermediate distribution levels. The wholesaler who adver-
tises, it is said, can recoup his costs only if his retailers do not
import from other member states where the price is lower.
Once again, the ban on cross supplies turns out to be in reality
a ban on imports, maintaining price differentiation, and it must
be justified, if possible, as such under article 85(3). In the case
of patented or similar products, efforts to provide territorial
protection against competition from third parties ("closed"
systems) are always contrary to article 85(1)16 and selective dis-
tribution systems are at least equally restrictive in relation to
parallel imports by middlemen.
It has already been indicated that restrictions on sales by
approved dealers to nonapproved dealers restrict competition
16. Nungesser v. Comm'n, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2015, [1981-1983 Trans-
fer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8805.
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within the meaning of article 85(1) unless they are necessitated
by some objective characteristic of the product in question or
some genuine necessity for its distribution, as distinct from a
commercial preference on the part of the manufacturer.17
Chard, considering selective distribution agreements pri-
marily in the context of a single member state, does not discuss
the economic effects of a ban on sales between approved deal-
ers in different member states with different price levels,
although he considers other restrictive effects of bans on sales
between approved dealers."8 He is, however, right to say that
whether the market is concentrated is important, not only
when assessing bans on cross supplies, but also whether other
manufacturers have selective distribution agreements. He is
also right to point out that selective distribution arrangements
facilitate collusion by dealers, both with other dealers and with
manufacturers. This is so when dealers are obliged to inform
the manufacturer of the serial numbers of the goods they sell,
since this makes it easy to identify the source of parallel im-
ports. Chard is also right to say that bans on sales between
approved dealers help manufacturers to charge different prices
in different member states. Not only is this particularly impor-
tant in this situation, but also if parallel imports do not occur
on a significant scale, and if the prices charged are proportion-
ately unequal to the seller's marginal costs.
IX. ARE SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTIONS WORKABLE IN
ONLY SOME MEMBER S TA TES?
The next question to be considered is a practical one: Can
a manufacturer expect to make his distribution system work in
the Community if it is selective in some member states and not
in others?
The difficulty may be explained simply. In any state where
the manufacturer's distribution system is nonselective, his
dealers will be free to sell to nonapproved dealers, including
nonapproved dealers in member states where his system is a
selective one. They can be prevented from doing this only by
an export ban, or the equivalent, or by converting the system
17. United Brands v. Comm'n, 1978 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 207, 289, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, at 7713.
18. See Chard, supra note 7.
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into a selective one. It seems to follow that a manufacturer
cannot expect such distribution arrangements to operate satis-
factorily and legally when price levels in the state with the non-
selective system are lower than those in the states where the
distribution systems are selective.
There is also a theoretical problem. Selective distribution
systems are usually defended on the grounds that they are in
some sense necessary for the satisfactory distribution of the
product. This is difficult to accept if the product is distributed
by the same manufacturer in another member state without a
selective system. In any case, in most of the industries in which
selective distribution is practiced there is at least one manufac-
turer who distributes its products without having a selective
system. Selective distribution systems may be advantageous,
but they are rarely necessary.
Other questions arise. It is argued that selective distribu-
tion agreements are necessary on various grounds. The valid-
ity of these arguments, or their relevance, is called in question
if the criteria for selection are significantly different in different
member states, or if the criteria are not related, in the light of
the circumstances in each state, to the justification suggested.
X. EFFECTS ON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES
Some manufacturers have separate selective distribution
systems in each member state, and claim that trade between
member states is not affected by any of them, because each is
independent of all the others. This argument is rarely, if ever,
valid. Each national system must be looked at in its context,
and its context includes the manufacturer's distribution sys-
tems for the same products in other member states. Dealers in
a selective distribution system are prohibited from selling to
unapproved dealers, and this prevents them from selling to
nonapproved dealers in other member states. Any restrictions
on exports by approved dealers necessarily affect trade be-
tween member states.
Clauses in selective distribution agreements which tend to
keep prices up and to limit or exclude intrabrand price compe-
tition tend similarly to create an incentive for goods to flow in
from other member states if they are not prevented from doing
so. Selective distribution agreements also make it difficult for
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a dealer from one country to enter the market in another,
although the frontier may only be a few kilometers away. Inso-
far as selective distribution agreements tend to keep the na-
tional markets of member states economically separate from
one another, and to maintain different price levels, they auto-
matically affect trade between member states and create incen-
tives for parallel imports. They also make it easy to trace
goods back to dealers who are exporting because they are usu-
ally combined with obligations to record the serial numbers of
goods sold.
It is frequently said that price differences between mem-
ber states are due to changes in the rates of exchange of their
currencies. Such changes alter price levels, but if substantial
price differences continue, that can only be due to the absence
of effective competition between dealers in the member states.
If prices for a given product in one member state remain
higher than those in another even when exchange rates fluctu-
ate, some other, protectionist, explanation is to be sought.
XI. SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS OF OTHER
MANUFACTURERS
The Court has pointed out that structural rigidity of the
market would be increased if too many manufacturers had se-
lective distribution systems.' 9 This would be particularly un-
desirable if the market was highly concentrated, or if there was
little trade between member states for technical reasons, or if
some or all of the manufacturers had resale price maintenance,
if it was lawful. Widespread use of selective distribution would
make prices rigid and reduce interbrand competition, create
barriers to entry into retailing, and make distribution systems
inflexible. It would facilitate horizontal collusion between
manufacturers, or between dealers, or both. If such horizontal
collusion was shown to have occurred, it might be a reason for
withdrawing exemption from or refusing exemption for the se-
lective distribution agreements of the parties to the collusion.
19. See Van Landewyck v. Comm'n, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3125, 3265,
[1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8687, at 8196; Lanc6me v.
Etos, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2511, 2536-37, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8714, at 8588; Metro SB-Grossmarkte GmbH, 1977 E.
Comm. J. Rep. 1875, 1905, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
$ 8435, at 7868; Sharpe, supra note 2, at 65.
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If, on the other hand, all the manufacturers had similar selec-
tive distribution agreements and it was found that there was
very little competition, it might be necessary for the Commis-
sion to insist that they should all be modified.
XII. ACTION BY MANUFACTURERS NOT EXPRESSLY
CONTEMPLATED BY THE DEALER AGREEMENTS:
TERMINATION OF SUPPLIES AS EVIDENCE OF
RESTRICTIONS ON COMPETITION
The fact that a restrictive agreement or concerted practice
between the manufacturer and dealer in a distribution system
is not found in the formal dealer agreement does not, of
course, prevent the agreement or practice from falling under
article 85(1) if there is other evidence of its existence. This
applies to the two restrictive features in a selective distribution
system; the limit on the number of dealers appointed and the
ban on sale to nonapproved dealers just as much as to other
restrictions.
It sometimes happens that after a dealer agreement has
been entered into, an occasion arises on which the manufac-
turer makes it clear that he will not supply the dealer with his
products unless the dealer ceases to export, or to buy parallel
imports, or to charge reduced prices, or to do something else
to which the manufacturer objects. The manufacturer may, in
other words, make it a condition of continued supplies that the
dealer ceases to behave in a particular way. In such circum-
stances, whether or not the dealer actually promises not to be-
have in the manner in question is not particularly important; if
he continues to obtain supplies on the basis of the condition
stated by the manufacturer, the condition has become a part of
the overall arrangements, whether agreement or concerted
practice, between the manufacturer and the dealer.
No doubt in such situations it is unlikely that any fine
should be imposed on the dealer, who has had to accept an
unlawful condition under pressure of having his supplies cut
off.20 No doubt also much will depend on the precise nature of
the evidence available. But in principle, on appropriate evi-
20. But see BMW Belgium S.A. v. Comm'n, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2435,
2478, 2496-97, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8548, at
7879, 7890.
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dence it should be held that where the manufacturer treats
dealers' compliance with his policy as a condition of continued
supply to them, by terminating supplies to a dealer because the
dealer will not agree to cease the conduct to which the manu-
facturer objects or otherwise, there is an infringement of arti-
cle 85. Alternatively it may be appropriate to analyze the situa-
tion along the lines explained in the next section.
In practice it is not feasible, at least not more than once or
twice, for a manufacturer unilaterally to terminate supplies to a
particular dealer on the grounds that the dealer is exporting,
importing, or cutting prices, if the manufacturer has never pre-
viously indicated that it objects to the conduct in question.
The dealers would understandably regard it as unreasonable,
and the manufacturer would lose much goodwill. Other deal-
ers would become aware of the risk of being deprived of sup-
plies, and they would either protest successfully or would ulti-
mately accept the manufacturer's policy as a condition of re-
ceiving supplies, thereby developing a concerted practice, even
if it was one imposed or initiated by the manufacturer. After
all, while individual dealers may have an interest in price cut-
ting or importing parallel imports, dealers in general are un-
likely to object strongly to the manufacturer taking measures
which are likely to, and are intended to, keep prices up.
If a manufacturer with a selective distribution system
agreed with any of its approved dealers that it would cut off
supplies to any dealer who exported, imported parallel im-
ports, or cut prices, not only would this agreement be unlawful
as a boycott but it would be likely to make the selective distri-
bution system itself ineligible for exemption.
XIII. UNILATERAL ACTION BY MANUFACTURERS WHICH
MAKES ARTICLE 85(3) INAPPLICABLE
An agreement or concerted practice which falls under arti-
cle 85(1) is unlawful and void and must be terminated, unless it
falls under article 85(3). Whether article 85(3) applies de-
pends on all the surrounding circumstances,"' both in the
21. The Court has repeatedly said that in applying article 85 of the EEC Treaty,
supra note 3, all the surrounding circumstances must be taken into account. See, e.g.,
Coditel S.A. Cine-Vog Films S.A., 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 3381, 3402, [1981-1983
Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8865, at 8184-85; Lanc6me v. Etos,
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member state in which the agreement or practice applies, if, as
in the case of most selective distribution agreements, it is only
between companies in a single state, and in other member
states where it has economic effects (normally, in practice, a
higher-price market protected by action taken in the context of
the agreement in question). A fortiori, it is important to con-
sider the effects of any conduct by any party to the agreement
which, even if not contemplated by the agreement, causes the
effect of the agreement to be more serious or more extensive
than they would otherwise be.
The best known example of this principle is in article 3 of
Regulation 67/67. That article renders the group exemption
for exclusive distribution agreements inapplicable if
the contracting parties make it difficult for intermediaries or
consumers to obtain the goods to which the contract relates
from other dealers within the Common Market, in particu-
lar where the contracting parties:
(1) exercise industrial property rights to prevent deal-
ers or consumers from obtaining from other parts
of the Common Market or from selling in the terri-
tory covered by the contract goods to which the
contract relates which are properly marked or
otherwise properly placed on the market;
(2) exercise other rights or take other measures to pre-
vent dealers or consumers from obtaining from
elsewhere goods to which the contract relates or
from selling them in the territory covered by the
contract.
Under this article, any action which makes it difficult for
parallel importers or consumers to obtain the goods in ques-
tion from dealers in other member states makes the group ex-
emption inapplicable. It does not matter that the action is not
1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2511, 2536, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8714, at 8594; S.A. Cadillon v. Firma Hoss, 1971 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep.
351, 356, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8135, at 7542-
43; Consten & Grundig v. Comm'n, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, 343, [1961-1966
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046, at 7653; Socit Technique
Miniire Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 235, 240-50, [1961-
1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8047, at 88-97.
The same principle is shown by the same judgment in Metro SB-Grossmarkte
GmbH v. Comm'n, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8435 and by Regulation No. 67/67, art. 3, 10 J.O.
COMM. EUR. 849 (1967), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2727.
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the subject of any agreement or concerted practice between
the parties to the agreement in question, and so would not be,
if it had occurred by itself, an infringement of article 85(1). Uni-
lateral action by one party to an agreement whose action
would not in itself infringe article 85(1) may nevertheless be
sufficient to make article 85(3) inapplicable to the agreement,
if article 85(1) applies to the agreement for other reasons.22
Therefore, if there is a selective distribution agreement to
which article 85(1) applies for any reason, and the manufac-
turer refuses to supply goods to a dealer who exports, or im-
ports parallel imports, or reduces prices, the refusal to supply
may make article 85(3) inapplicable to the agreement, even if
there is no evidence of any agreement or concerted practice by
which the dealer's freedom to export was limited. The unilat-
eral refusal to sell is not, in itself, a violation of article 85(1),
but it has the same effect as any other measure interfering with
parallel imports (or with price competition) would have, viz. it
makes article 85(3) inapplicable. This is not to say that there is
in itself an obligation to supply under article 85(1). Similarly,
continued deliveries to dealers who reduce prices, or who ob-
tain parallel imports, is also likely to be a prerequisite for ex-
emption, assuming an exemption is needed for other reasons.
Of course, if there is no agreement or practice anywhere
in the Common Market to which article 85(1) applies, a unilat-
eral refusal by a manufacturer or distributor to supply a dealer
cannot by itself make article 85(1) applicable to the dealer
agreement. But if there is an agreement to which article 85(1)
applies, it may be appropriate that it should be a condition of
an exemption that the manufacturer should not refuse to sup-
ply dealers elsewhere in the Community with products to be
exported to the state in which the agreement in question ap-
plies, just as if exports were prevented by the exercise of indus-
trial or commercial property rights. Equally, it may be a condi-
tion that the manufacturer should supply the parties to the
agreement with products to be exported to other member
22. See AEG-Telefunken v. Comm'n, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 3151, 3195, 3
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 14,018, at 14,258; Nungesser v. Comm'n, 1982 E.
Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2015, 2070, 2073-74, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8805, at 7545-46; see also Ford Werke, 26 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 327)
31 (1983), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,539 (final decision, currently under
appeal).
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states of the Community. The agreement may be in either the
importing or the exporting country.
In other words, it may be and usually is a prerequisite of
an exemption under article 85(3) for a selective distribution
agreement that intrabrand competition, already substantially
limited by the selective distribution system itself, must not be
substantially limited further by unilateral policies on the part
of the manufacturer, whether their effect is to partition the
Common Market or to restrict intrabrand price competition.
Specifically, it may be a prerequisite for exemption that
dealers should be free to sell to approved dealers and to cus-
tomers outside their own territories and their own member
states, and that customers should not be penalized, for exam-
ple, by denial of the benefits of manufacturers' guarantees, if
they buy outside their member states. Indeed if intrabrand
price differences for movable products between member states
are so great as to suggest market partitioning and insufficient
intrabrand competition, it is logical that an exemption which
might otherwise be given should be withdrawn. Companies
have no right to make their dealers immune from intrabrand
competition.
A specific example of a unilateral policy which would be
likely to make exemption inappropriate is two-tier pricing in a
selective distribution system i.e., a lower price if the goods are
sold for use in the member state in question, and a higher
price if the goods are exported.
XIV. ARTICLE 15(6)
Article 15(6) of Regulation 17/62 ends the immunity from
fines which is provided by notification of an agreement which
falls under article 85(1), if the Commission adopts a decision
stating that "after a preliminary examination" it considers that
the application of article 85(3) is not justified.
It follows from what has been said above that a selective
distribution system accompanied by unilateral measures by the
manufacturer to terminate supplies to dealers exporting, buy-
ing parallel imports, or not complying with the manufacturer's
resale price maintenance policy could normally be made the
subject of a decision under article 15(6) on that ground.
The practical effect of such a decision would be to compel
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a manufacturer to choose between several possible courses of
action. First, it could end the interference with exporting, par-
allel importing, or price cutting. This would end the reason
for saying that article 85(3) was inapplicable. New notification
of the agreement might be necessary, but in other respects the
selective distribution agreements could continue to operate,
and a formal exemption under article 85(3) could be obtained,
combined probably with a condition terminating the exemp-
tion if the manufacturer refused to supply dealers who export,
import, or cut prices.
Second, it could put an end to all the features of the distri-
bution agreements which make article 85(1) applicable. If it
was willing to do this, it would be free, as far as article 85 was
concerned and apart from its obligations under any applicable
national law, to refrain from supplying to dealers whose prac-
tices it disliked. However, it could not, even by implication,
agree with dealers that they should refrain from these prac-
tices. The manufacturer would therefore be wise not to tell the
dealers that it would terminate supplies if they did specific
things, since any such statement could easily be construed as
the basis for a concerted practice. Finally, it could challenge
the validity of the Commission's decision under article 15(6), if
it has any grounds for doing so, and risk being fined for contin-
uing to practice its selective agreement and its policy of refus-
ing to supply dealers who export, import, or cut prices.
XV. TERMINATING INFRINGEMENTS
Article 7 of Regulation 17/62 gives the Commission
power by decision to require the enterprises involved to bring
an infringement of article 85 to an end. A manufacturer who
combines a selective distribution system with measures, even
unilateral measures, to prevent exports, parallel imports, or
price cutting, commits an infringement of the EEC Treaty.
When the Commission orders it to end the infringement, it has
a choice: it may abandon its selective distribution agreements,
so that what it is doing no longer falls under article 85(1), or it
may cease interfering with exports, imports, or price cutting,
as the case may be. To cease its interference with these legiti-
mate activities of dealers the manufacturer would have to re-
sume supplies to any dealer from whom supplies had been cut
19851 355
356 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 8:323
off, unless it could be proved that there was some valid objec-
tive and nonrestrictive reason sufficient to justify refusal to re-
new supplies. In this sense there can be an obligation to sup-
ply under article 85(1) combined with article 3 of Regulation
17/62, for the purpose of putting an end to an infringement.2
3
It follows that if a manufacturer has a selective distribution
agreement to which article 85(1) applies and if the manufac-
turer terminates supplies to a dealer who is exporting, import-
ing parallel imports, or reducing its resale prices, the manufac-
turer is almost certainly acting contrary to article 85(3). If
therefore, the dealer brings proceedings in a national court for
compensation and for an order obliging the manufacturer to
resume supplies, it would not normally be necessary for the
national judge to adjourn the case to allow the Commission to
decide whether or not an exemption should be given under
article 85(3). However, no such exemption would be likely to
be appropriate. Unless, at the time when the case came before
the national judge, the manufacturer had altered its selective
distribution agreements in such a way that article 85(1) no
longer applied to them, the dealer would normally be entitled
to succeed with his claim for compensation. Whether his claim
for an injunction ordering the resumption of supplies should
be granted would depend on the circumstances of the case.
However, if the national law did not make possible an order
imposing a positive obligation to supply on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis in any circumstances, the dealer would have to apply
to the Commission, and there would be at least a serious ques-
tion as to whether the absence of any remedy under national
law was a breach of the obligations of the member state in
question under article 5 to protect the rights of citizens under
directly applicable rules of Community Law.
This would be the position where the manufacturer has
selective distribution agreements in all member states, or at
least in the member state where the dealer carries on his busi-
ness. A rather different situation arises if the dealer has been
supplied directly by the manufacturer, until the latter cut off
23. This is compatible with the general principle referred to in COMMISSION,
ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY para. 11, at 24 (1982); see also Demo Stu-
dio Schmidt v. Comm'n, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3045, 3064, 3 COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 14,009, at 14,119. But see Ford Werke v. Comm'n, 1984 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 1129, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 14,025.
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supplies, but there is no distribution agreement to which arti-
cle 85(1) applies in the member state in question. In that situa-
tion, the dealer cannot lawfully be prevented from buying from
other dealers in member states where there are selective distri-
bution agreements, since they can hardly be prevented from
selling to any dealer in a state where the manufacturer has no
selection system for dealers. If the manufacturer tried to pre-
vent dealers in a selective system from exporting to a dealer,
even a dealer which the manufacturer itself did not wish to
supply, in a country where there was no selection system, the
manufacturer would be likely to make the selective distribution
system unlawful. If the manufacturer tried to prevent dealers
in a state with no selective distribution system from exporting
to nonapproved dealers in a state where the manufacturer had
a selective system, it would also risk invalidating the latter sys-
tem.
XVI. INTERESTS OF THIRD PARTIES
Selective distribution cases frequently involve third par-
ties. They are usually dealers who have been refused admis-
sion to the distribution system. They may also be dealers in
other countries who are the beneficiaries of restrictions on ex-
ports, or of other measures to keep prices up. In this context
several recent developments may be of interest.
In Ford Werke v. Commission, the Court gave two United
Kingdom Ford dealers leave to intervene in support of Ford.
The United Kingdom dealers benefitted from Ford's termina-
tion of supplies of right-hand drive cars at low German prices
to German dealers. The Court's order seems to represent a
change in the Court's view on the rights of dealers in one
member state to intervene in cases involving a restrictive
agreement in another member state.2 4
The Court also gave the Bureau Europ~en des Unions de
Consommateurs leave to intervene, on broad grounds which
24. The Court's order, dated February 2, 1983, in Ford Werke v. Comm'n, 1984
E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 357, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 14,025 (interim measures)
seems to imply that its comments in Consten & Grundig v. Comm'n, 1966 E. Comm.
Ct.J. Rep. 299, 346, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046,
at 7656, no longer represents its attitude.
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suggest that it would be entitled to intervene in many cases
involving consumer interests or consumer products.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of all these detailed comments on qualitative
and quantitative criteria is not to advocate a stricter policy on
selective distribution as such. It is merely to show that the
range of questions is more complex, and the answers less sim-
ple than they might seem, and to show that instead of using a
few simple legal rules it is necessary to consider the economic
effects of each selective distribution agreement, like those of
any other distribution agreement, in the light of all the circum-
stances. In this respect I agree with Chard,25 though I do not
agree with his criticisms of what the Court and the Commis-
sion have actually done. More detailed explanations may be
needed to show that the Commission's rulings have been con-
sistent. As a result, and without in any way anticipating any
legislation which the Commission may propose on selective
distribution agreements in any particular sector, it is necessary
to make general statements rather than try to formulate formal
legal rules applicable to every case.
Even where there are no express territorial restrictions or
resale price maintenance clauses, selective distribution systems
are likely to have some restrictive effects on competition in
practice, and so must be examined critically. Authorized deal-
ers are likely to be fully informed of each other's identities and
conscious of each other's policies. Selective distribution sys-
tems often have certain features in practice:
1. They are likely to be associated with measures to prevent
sales outside the dealers' territories, or at least outside the
member state in question, to maintain price levels, and with
resale price measures;
2. They facilitate, and are particularly likely to be associ-
ated with, concerted practices, pressure from manufactur-
ers, or other practices not expressly mentioned in the distri-
bution agreements, to enforce measures with more restric-
tive effects on competition than the terms of the agreements
themselves;
3. They always reduce intrabrand competition, especially
25. See Chard, supra note 7.
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intrabrand price competition, to a greater or lesser extent,
to maintain high gross profit margins for dealers;
4. They exist often in sectors in which most manufacturers
have a selective distribution system and where the market is
therefore rather rigid;
5. In Salonia v. Poidomani, the Court pointed out another
characteristic of selective distribution systems which are or-
ganized on a national basis. "Such an agreement which ex-
tends throughout the territory of a member state may by its
very nature have the effect of reinforcing the partitioning of
the market on a national basis, thereby impeding the eco-
nomic interpenetration which the Treaty is designed to
bring about and protecting national production."26
The general policy of the Commission is therefore to pro-
hibit selective distribution arrangements where they are con-
bined with territorial protection, resale price maintenance
measures, or horizontal arrangements between distributors, or
dealers, or both, to avoid price differences arising. In other
cases, if the restriction on competition is sufficient for article
85(1) to apply, serious reasons must be given for any exemp-
tion. However, a selective distribution agreement which is not
combined with any efforts to maintain prices or to divide the
Common Market is in an entirely different situation from one
which is combined with efforts or arrangements with that ef-
fect. The Court has stressed that agreements can be exempted
under article 85(3) only if there are "appreciable objective ad-
vantages of such a character as to compensate for the disad-
vantages which they cause in the field of competition. '27 In
the case of such selective distribution agreements, for the rea-
sons outlined above, the advantages in practice often do not
compensate for the disadvantages, whatever theoretical de-
fense could be made for the words of the agreements them-
selves.
As with most types of restrictive agreements, the crucial
question is not whether a selective distribution agreement is
restrictive, but how restrictive it is in practice. If one leaves
26. Salonia v. Poidomani, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1563, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8758.
27. Consten & Grundig v. Comm'n, 1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 299, 348, [1961-
1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046, at 7656; see SSI, 25 OJ.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 232) 1, 32 (1982), 3 COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 10,408, at
10,904.
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aside for the moment export bans, resale price maintenance,
and similar practices which are not inherent in selective distri-
bution, it seems that the principal issue is the effect on price
competition of the limit on the number of outlets. Barriers to
entry are less important, unless they affect price competition as
they do in supermarkets and hypermarkets.
Concentrating on the effect on price competition has
many advantages. First, it looks at the results of the system in
practice and not merely at the effect of the clauses in theory,
and so takes into account all the practices whether unilateral or
concerted, and whether known to the person seeking to make
the assessment or not, which may have grown up and which
may add to the restrictiveness of a selective distribution sys-
tem. Second, it makes possible a simple, practical, and eco-
nomically justifiable approach. If price levels in different mem-
ber states differ by more than a limited percentage for a signifi-
cant period, without convincing explanation, the distribution
agreements are proving too restrictive and need to be looked
at closely and perhaps modified. Finally, it also makes appro-
priate two practical tests which are called for by the basic need
to unify the market: Is every approved dealer free to supply all
the products sold by him to buyers from all other member
states, and are buyers correspondingly free to buy from all
dealers, if necessary through intermediaries, in each case with-
out "discrimination"? 28 If the answer to these questions is yes,
there should be a reasonable degree of interstate trade and in-
trabrand price competition. If there is not, an explanation may
be needed. For this purpose "discrimination" may include de-
lays in delivery of goods to be sold to nonresident buyers or
suitable for export, or refusal to honor a guarantee or warranty
if the goods were purchased in another member state, or dif-
ferential pricing.
Accordingly, it seems to me personally that in order to
limit the amount of time to be spent by the Commission on
selective distribution cases one could envisage group exemp-
tions which would apply if there was a satisfactory degree of
28. Ford Werke, 25 o.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 256) 20, 26 (1982), 3 COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 10,419, at 10,931 (interim measures); BMW, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 29) 1, 7, 8 (1975), [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9701,
at 9539-10 to 9539-11; COMMISSION, ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
para. 11, at 24 (1982).
REMARKS
interbrand competition and if, but only if, the following other
conditions were all fulfilled:
1. No horizontal collusion between either manufacturers or
dealers; no vertical collusion on prices or market partition-
ing; and no serious likelihood of any such collusion;
2. No interference with or discrimination against parallel
imports by dealers in either member state or by the manu-
facturer;
3. No resale price maintenance;
4. Criteria must be uniform and applied in a nondiscrimina-
tory fashion, and any differences between member states
must be explained fully and justified;
5. Differences between price levels in different member
states to be less than a specified percentage;
6. No selective distribution if the manufacturer is dominant
(because interbrand competition will not be strong
enough).
Perhaps if it was clear that selective distribution agree-
ments had to comply with these principles, they would be less
fashionable than they are at present. If that is so, very strong
and clear arguments would be needed to justify exempting a
selective distribution system that did not fulfill these require-
ments.
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